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Criminal law and constitutional narratives 
How did the American Revolution shape the emergence of a robust, often 
sophisticated language of law? This essay argues that legal language in the 
formative era of American law can best be understoot by examining public 
responses to highly publicized criminal trials. Such an approach marks a 
significant departure from the received historiography. Most traditional 
historians have portrayed American resistance to British domination as anti-
nomian, involving largely riots and extra-legal civil disobedience. 
This article shows the opposite was the case. Revolutionary Americans 
were not antinomian, but deeply concerned with legal norms. These legal 
norms did not await the ratification of the Constitution, but were constructed 
from the fabric of political, and even ordinary, criminal law cases which 
became deeply contested causes célèbres. The essay consists of two close rea-
dings of inter wining cases that took place in Boston during the 1760s. 
During the course of these two courtroom trials, a ground-swell of extra-offi-
cial examinations of these cases-many of them aimed at a popular audience-
served to create a criminal law jurisprudence with a revolutionary cast. 
De quelle manière la Révolution américaine a-t-elle contribué à l'émer-
gence d'un discours juridique solide et souvent élaboré? Nous considérons 
que c'est en étudiant les réactions publiques à des procès pénaux à forte 
visibilité que l'on peut comprendre le discours de la période où le droit 
américain s'est constitué. Une telle approche s'éloigne nettement de l'histo-
riographie reçue. La plupart des historiens traditionnels ont dépeint la résis-
tance américaine la domination britannique sous la forme principalement 
d'un rejet des lois, d'émeutes et de désobéissance civile. Cet article montre le 
contraire, à partir de l'analyse de deux affaires entremêlées, qui se déroulè-
rent à Boston dans les années 1760. Les révolutionnaires américains ne reje-
taient pas les lois et étaient très préoccupés par les normes juridiques. 
Celles-ci anticipèrent sur la constitution et étaient construites à partir d'af-
faires pénales ordinaires ou politiques qui devinrent des causes célèbres. Ces 
deux procès suscitèrent une véritable explosion d'analyses non-officielles -
visant fréquemment un public populaire - et qui contribuèrent à susciter une 
jurisprudence pénale de caractère révolutionnaire. 
Steven Wilf teaches at the University of Connecticut School of Law. He graduated with a J.D. from 
Yale Law School (1995) and a Ph. D. in History from Yale University (1995). Recently, he has been 
the Fellow in Comparative Legal History at the University of Chicago and a law clerk in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In addition to legal history, Mr. Wilf writes in the field of 
Intellectual Property. He is currently completing book on the relationship between politics and cri-
minal law in the period of the American Revolution. 
Steven Wilf 1 
Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies 2000, vol. 4, n° 1 , pp. 31-61 
in revolutionary Boston 
32 S T E V E N W I L F 
Constitutional scholars and social historians have uncovered two very diffe-rent languages of law articulated by revolutionary Americans. Constitu-
tional scholars have engaged in an archeological task, recovering a literary 
discourse about constitutional issues dealing with patriot theories of rights, the rela-
tionship between England and the colonies, and the quest for a balanced govern-
ment. This enterprise, of course, is related to their interest in the historical 
foundations of American Constitutionalism. On the other hand, historians have been 
concerned with a quite different legal language, one which seems hardly legal and, 
at times, hardly a language at all. In fact, historians have often portrayed the rela-
tionship of ordinary Americans in the Revolution as antinomian : launching extra-
legal attacks on British customs officials ; engaging in riots and a broad array of civil 
disobedience meant to shunt aside official legal norms, not to engage with them. 
These two approaches - one focused on a learned elite's articulated claims to 
higher constitutional authority, the other upon the common people's pragmatic 
extra-legal actions - are portrayed as if, borrowing Disraeli's well-known metaphor, 
they were two trains traveling by parallel tracks which head in the same direction 
while never meeting. Such an understanding of these two legal languages, of course, 
is troubling. On one hand, the American Revolution is described as a sophisticated 
and somewhat rarified ideological transformation authored by bourgeois radicals, 
and awaiting its apotheosis nearly two decades later in the Constitutional Conven-
tion at Philadelphia. It is, on the other hand, a popular insurrection centered in the 
streets, looking backwards to the tradition of Anglo-American popular radicalism, 
but divorced from the soon to emerge law-centered world of the Early Republic. 
This essay rejects the very notion that either paradigm, constitutionalism or anti-
nomianism, reflect the full engagement of revolutionary Americans with legal 
consciousness. Instead, it seeks to show through a pair of micro-historical close rea-
dings precisely how significant was the interaction between official justice and 
extra-official legal public opinion. Common people spoke the language of common 
law. Citizens of revolutionary Boston inserted themselves into the process of legal 
interpretation, evaluating evidence, interpreting doctrine, and determining procedu-
ral issues. Instead of an antinomian rejection of legal norms, Bostonians in the revo-
lutionary period recast those norms. But neither was this popular legalism simply 
derivative from constitutional claims to higher law. It emerged out of interpretations 
of the technical règlement of common law rules and conflict over the deciding of 
specific cases. 
To fully understand the complexity of revolutionary readings of law requires 
close readings of contemporaries interpreting cases. In the two Boston cases we will 
examine, those of Ebenezer Richardson and Levi Ames, opinions delivered in 
broadsides, newspapers, and the street overturned official sentences. Ebenezer 
Richardson, a customs officer who accidentally shot a rioter in 1770, was freed by 
the authorities. Nevertheless, many Boston citizens thought him guilty of murder. 
But when a career criminal, Levi Ames was sentenced to be hanged for burglary in 
1773 there was a popular outcry against the harshness of his punishment. Both 
began with outrage about a single incident which later swelled into a broad critique 
of English justice. In fact, Bostonians intertwined the two controversies by contras-
ting Richardson's pardon for the more serious crime of murder with the execution of 
Ames for a property crime. 
At the center of popular understandings of law was the notion of placing blame. 
Revolutionary Americans appropriated both official legal process and popular 
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genres, such as execution narratives, used to blame criminals, and attached that cul-
pability to legal regimes themselves. Establishing their roles as interpreters of legal 
process, late eighteenth-century Americans learned to turn upside down legal hie-
rarchies : judges were judged, codes were shorn of their power. And, most impor-
tantly, through the grappling with cases, evolved a language of law that was both 
norm-centered and radical at the same time. 
* 
* * 
«If there was even a color of justice in the public opinion», wrote John Adams 
about Ebenezer Richardson, «he was the most abandoned wretch in America. 
Adultery, incest, perjury were reputed to be his ordinary crimes. His life would 
exhibit an atrocious volume». Adams comment is revealing. Colonial felons awai-
ting hanging would come with just such a volume: an execution narrative. A bio-
graphical study of transgression, the execution narrative would catalogue earlier 
arrests for theft, counterfeiting, or the like. By commenting that Richardson deser-
ved his own execution narrative, Adams suggests the need to see him as a common 
felon. Yet Richardson lacked the trail of felonies that marked the life most executed 
criminals. Public opinion had the task, then, of constructing a fictive biographical 
narrative that would justify treating him like any other murderer. Lacking a narrative 
tale for his crime, it was necessary to invent one 2. 
Little is known about Richardson's real life. Born at Woburn in 1718, he was a 
direct descendent of the Richardson brothers who helped found the town in the 
1640s. Unlike most colonial felons, he came from a substantial family. Richardson's 
father owned eighty acres of Woburn land and another fifty-one acres at Stoneham. 
He left two-thirds of this land to his son Ebenezer. In 1740, two years prior to inhe-
riting his father's estate, Richardson married a widow twelve years his senior. As the 
daughter of the town clerk, she was equally connected. Perhaps the only documen-
tary hint of Richardson's contentiousness was the suit, only a year after his marriage, 
against the estate of his wife's deceased husband for support of her three minor chil-
dren 3. 
Yet Richardson would be transformed into what one newspaper called an «old 
offender.» In 1770, at the height of the Richardson affair, a remarkable document 
appeared: a broadside pretending to be a first-person verse confession. Its purpose 
was to fabricate Richardson's criminal past. The fictive confession called upon his 
native town of Woburn for testimony: « Woburn, my native place can tell/My crimes 
are blacker far than Hell/What great disturbance there I made/Against the people 
and their head.» These verses alluded to a controversy over an adulterous affair that 
tore apart Woburn in 1752, and laid bare long-standing social divisions within the 
town. As with many New England towns, the conflict in Woburn centered around 
2
 Letter John Adams to Dr. J. Morse, 20 Jan. 1816 in Adams, (1851, 10, p.204-210). On fictive bio-
graphy see: Eakin (1985, p. 181-278) and Laden, (1987, p. 3-29). A small number of essays have 
explored the narrative literature surrounding condemned felons, including execution sermons, 
pardon petitions, dying speeches, and execution narratives, in England, France, and America: 
Sharpe (1985), Linebaugh (1977), Davis (1987, p. 1-35). See also: Cohen (1988). 
3
 Johnson (1890, p. 213); Vinton (1876, p. 208, 242-244, and 523-524). Middlesex County Probate 
Records, 24 January 1742/3,19182. 
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the meeting house. In 1728, a young minister newly graduated from Harvard, 
Edward Jackson, was hired to assist John Fox. Resentment over salaries and duties 
quickly emerged between the two ministers. Backed by different factions, the battle 
between the ministers came to a peak after the building of the new meeting house. 
Fox's partisans threatened secession from the parish. In the midst of this struggle, a 
widow, Keziah Henshaw, gave birth to an illegitimate child. Perhaps bribed by Fox's 
supporters, she accused Jackson of being the father4. 
Accepting Henshaw's accusation, Reverend Josiah Cotton launched a partisan 
attack on Jackson, claiming he was unfit for the ministry. Jackson sued for libel. The 
case dragged through the courts with the Court of Common pleas deciding in 
Jackson's favor. Cotton appealed to the Superior Court, where the jury overturned 
the lower court's ruling. Legal fees mounted and the acrimony between the factions 
grew intense. Finally, there was a dramatic discovery which ended the case. A letter 
to Henshaw, which showed the charges were false and fabricated by Fox's suppor-
ters, fell into Jackson's hands. Jackson petitioned the superior court. Reversing a 
ruling one last time, the court found for Jackson. 
What was Richardson's involvement in this affair? Edmund Trowbridge, attor-
ney general of Massachusetts and later justice at Richardson's trial, wrote that 
Richardson was «very serviceable to me in detecting a conspiracy to father a bastard 
child on the parson of a parish». It appears, then, that Richardson was somehow 
party to the events in Woburn and his defense of the falsely accused Jackson ironi-
cally may have marked the beginning of work as an informer. There is no evidence 
of Richardson's paternity. Nevertheless, a number of oddly coincidental facts might 
incorrectly suggest otherwise. Not only was Richardson from Woburn, but Keziah 
Henshaw was his wife's younger sister. It appears that another Ebenezer Richardson, 
not the one who confronted rioters in Boston, married Keziah Henshaw in 1754. 
And there was one more strange coincidence: Richardson had a sister and a daugh-
ter, who lived with him in Boston, both named Keziah 5. 
When Bostonians turned to reinventing Richardson's biography, they enlisted 
this tale of adultery to serve their purposes. Richardson was to blame for fathering 
Henshaw's child. Perhaps because of his family connection, he was also charged, as 
Adam's comment suggests, with incest. In the words of his fictive verse confession: 
«A wretch of wretches prov'd with child/By me I know, at which I smil'd.» But 
Richardson was not just accused of adultery and incest, but guilty of homicide as 
well. Shortly after winning the suit, Jackson died. His death was ascribed to the suf-
fering experienced while defending his reputation. Richardson, according to the 
confession, killed Jackson: «And thus the worthy man of God/Unjustly felt the 
scourging rod/Which broke his heart, it prov'd his end/And for the whole blood I 
guilty stand ». Establishing Richardson as guilty of a prior homicide had important 
4
 Boston Gazette, 26 February 1770. The Humble Confession of Richardson, The Informer [broadside, 
1770]. A Council Conven'd at Woburn, upon the Request of the Rev. Mr. Jackson and the First 
Church in Said Town To Hear and Advise upon the Great and Advise Upon the Great Difficulties 
Among Them (1746); Sewall (1868, p. 202-319). Suffolk County Court Records (Boston), 68,714. 
On the ministry and parish organization as locus of local conflict, see Heyrman (1984, p. 182-208 and 
273-303). Nobles (1983), and Ulrich (1990, p. 103-133). 
5
 Public Record Office, hereafter PRO (London), T1/408,18 March 1761. Vinton, 1876, p. 208-209. 
Fowle (1990, p. 35-37). Robert Treat Paine's minutes of the trial quotes testimony from Richardson's 
daughter, Kezia (Adams, 1965,2, p. 420). 
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legal implications. It would legitimize a capital sentence for Richardson. Mans-
laughter could be pardoned with benefit of clergy for the first offense, but was a 
capital crime for the second. «The halter now is justly due/For I've killed no less 
than two.» 6 
Slander of this kind was, of course, not unknown in eighteenth-century 
American politics. John Malcom, a Boston informer tarred and feathered in 
November 1774, was called, like Richardson, an «old impudent and mischievous 
offender». He was accused of mistreating children and having «joined in the 
murders » of North Carolina Regulators. Nevertheless, Richardson's case was signi-
ficant because of the way popular politics interjected itself into the judicial process. 
Richardson was being tried twice: once before magistrates and the other time out-
of-doors, on street corners and in taverns, where Bostonians debated his guilt. 
Rumor, fictive tales of fathering an illegitimate child, wild charges of murder, and 
sustained character assassination, all of which might have been dismissed as inad-
missable evidence by an official court, was the very marrow of this rough justice. 
Such accusations, then, tell us less about Richardson than the popular mood in revo-
lutionary Boston. Adultery was a striking motif to invoke since Richardson, after all, 
was engaged in political infidelity. His loyalty to neighbors had been transferred to 
the English 7. Placing blame through criminal biography fit nicely with the inconsis-
tencies of eighteenth-century criminal justice. Highly selective, this legal system 
tempered capital statutes with frequent pardons. One felon might be executed and 
another freed for the same crime. What justified punishment, then, was not simply 
the felony itself, but the character of the felon. Richardson's fictive biographical 
narrative addressed this issue. His act of murder might be punished with death 
because through his entire life he had been a «d - d villain» 8. In Richardson's case, 
he was an old offender - said to be guilty of adultery, incest, and homicide in 
Woburn, moreover, he violated community norms emerging from the political 
conflict between England and America. Responding to English passage of the 
Townsend Acts of 1767 levying duties on a variety of imported goods, Americans 
established non-importation agreements. Leading the way, Bostonians identified a 
long list of English goods that should not be imported, and enforced these agree-
ments through sanctions, boycotts, public scorn, and extra-legal crowd actions 
against violators. 
While contraband tea may be sold according to public opinion, Hutchinson com-
plained, it is « a high crime to sell any from England ». Hutchinson's statement was 
an admission of the ways that law had been turned upside down. While disobeying 
an act passed by parliament, the non-importation agreement - though lacking any 
official status - was seen by many colonials as law. A merchant importing contrary 
to the agreement, Theophilus Lillie, echoed Hutchinson. Through the coercion of 
the non-importation movement, he claimed that patriots chose «to make laws, and 
6
 Sewall (1868, p. 319-325); Richardson, Humble Confession. Wood (1982, p. 401-444). 
7
 Boston Evening Post, 23 April 1770. Another case tried before the Massachusetts Superior Court in 
1763, Rex v. Doaks, demonstrates the limits placed upon admission of testimony of past character as 
evidence. Indicted for having a house of prostitution, the court refused to allow allegations of earlier 
sexual misdeeds. Quincy (1865, p. 90-91). On language as provocation, see: Rosenberg (1986, p. 12-
56) and Bauman (1983). Seduction and infidelity were common late eighteenth-century literary 
themes. Lewis (1988) examines the political meaning of seduction. 
8
 Boston Gazette, 5 March 1770. 
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in the most effectual manner execute them upon me and others, to which laws, I am 
sure I never gave my consent either in person or by my representative ». But, like 
England's attempt to halt smuggling, enforcement was difficult. By the fall of 1769, 
the merchants' non-importation agreement had broadened as patriots attempted to 
have all Boston's citizens pledge not to consume those English products improperly 
imported 9. 
Yet some merchants continued to violate the agreement. Drawing upon the eigh-
teenth-century notion of shame as an integral part of punishment, they were puni-
shed through having their crimes publicized. Interestingly, the sanctions themselves 
took the form of official punishment. Boycott, like official fines, was a monetary 
penalty. By ostracizing merchants, patriots enforced, as the authorities did with 
transportation, a form of social and economic exile. Handbills circulated to publi-
cize the names of importers and townspeople were urged to extend their boycott 
from simply the imported goods to the violators as well. Bostonians, in January 
1770, voted to deny «not only all commercial dealings, but every act of common 
civility» from merchants who were especially fragrant violators. Four merchants -
John Taylor, William Jackson, Nathaniel Rogers, and Theophilus Lillie - were 
singled out for special abuse. Schoolboys taunted them, their houses and shops 
pelted with dirt, and potential customers intimidated. Defaced shop signs were 
replaced with placards warning against buying from them. Three February 
Thursdays in a row, market day in Boston and a school holiday, crowds gathered at 
the merchants' homes 1 0 . 
On the last of those Thursdays, February 22nd, a crowd collected at Lillie's 
home. A placard painted with the features of importers was erected pointing towards 
the house. According to one account of the event, Richardson, who lived nearby, 
became enraged by the sign. He urged others to knock it down with their wagons. 
No one responded so he seized a cart and attempted to knock it down himself. 
Richardson and the crowd traded insults. Retreating to his home, he vowed to 
defend it with a seaman, George Wilmot, who appears to have had connections with 
the customs commission. But despite the danger, there was a theatrical, almost far-
cical touch to the riot. Richardson and his wife repeatedly went into the street and 
menaced the schoolboys who had gathered. When the boys began throwing light 
rubbish, Richardson responded by pointing a gun out his door. Angered by this 
threat of violence, the crowd pelted the house with stones. Windows were broken. 
According to a sympathetic source, Richardson used his weapon only after being 
struck quite hard with a rock. He fired a volley of bullets, wounding two schoolboys. 
Eleven year-old Christopher Snider, struck in the chest and pierced by almost a 
dozen bullets, would die later that night 1 1. 
9
 Boston Post-Boy, 30 November 1767. Schlesinger (1957, p.91-155 and 179). Dickerson (1951, 
p. 190-202). Hutchinson, letter to Hillsborough, 27 April 1770,25 Massachusetts Archives (Boston). 
Massachusetts Gazette, 11 Jan. 1770. 
10
 Boston Gazette, 26 February 1770; « At a Meeting of the Merchants of Traders at Faneuil Hall on the 
23rd of January, 1770» [broadside]; Hutchinson (1936, 3, p. 193). Maier (1972, p. 114-130), 
Schlesinger (1957, p.156-183), Nash (1979, p. 352-360). 
1 1
 Sparks Manuscripts, Houghton Library (Harvard University), New England Papers, 16 March 1770, 
3:69; Boston Evening Post, 26 February 1770; Boston Gazette, 26 February 1770, Connecticut 
Journal and New-Haven Post Boy, 9 and 16 March, 1770; Hutchinson letter, 23 February 1770, 26 
Massachusetts Archives, 446-447; Boyle (1930, p. 262); Hoerder (1977, p. 219-223); Adams (1965, 
2, p. 396-400). 
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When Richardson first encountered the non-importation placard, he repeatedly 
cried out « perjury, perjury ». This was somewhat ironic because Richardson himself 
would suffer from that same accusation. Most likely alluding to Richardson's role in 
providing testimony against smugglers, Adams listed perjury among his crimes. In 
many ways, Richardson and the Boston crowd shared the same task: they sought to 
identify those who broke either official or unofficial codes. Whether with deposi-
tions, as Richardson made against smugglers, or with placards, handbills, and taun-
ting leveled against importers, language was the instrument used to wage the 
political and legal battle. No other term was so frequently used about Richardson as 
informer. « An informer », went one description, «and consequently a person of a 
most abandoned character». Richardson's fictive verse explains: «But yet still 
wicked, yet still vile, I've liv'd on honest merchants' spoil/For this I justly got the 
name/The informer, though with little gain» 1 2 . After the shooting, the mob seized 
Richardson and Wilmot. More people gathered as the bell at the New Brick meeting 
house was rung. The riot and shooting demonstrated that civil authority had broken 
down in Boston. What should be done with Richardson ? The first thought was to 
hang him up at once, Hutchinson claimed, and a halter was brought. But patriot 
leader William Molineux rescued Richardson from hanging, and brought the priso-
ner before Justice of the Peace John Ruddock 1 3. 
The justice of the peace consigned Richardson to constables who escorted him 
to Faneuil Hall. They had to contend with «the mob endeavoring to put a rope 
around his neck and take him from the constables to execute him themselves». At 
Faneuil Hall, Richardson was examined by a panel of judges - Richard Dana, 
Samuel Pemberton, and Edmund Quincy - and sent to prison for his own safety. 
Here, too, the public interjected itself in judicial proceedings. Over a thousand 
people, according to one newspaper's count, were present at the examination. 
Popular justice and official justice were not distinct and separate spheres, as histo-
rians have often suggested, but intertwined. Peter Oliver, Tory chronicler of the 
early stages of the American Revolution, claimed that reliance upon the courts was 
simply a question of convenience: «As the term of the Supreme Court was very 
near, and they thought that the blood of the unhappy youth, which had been spilt 
would not be cold before the court met; and they were pretty sure that they could 
procure a jury for conviction, so some of the leaders of the faction chose that he 
should be hanged by the forms of law, rather than suffer the disgrace of hangmen 
themselves» 1 4 . 
12
 Boston Evening-Post, 26 February 1770; Virginia Gazette, 5 April 1770; «Robert Treat Paine's 
Minutes of the Trial», in Adam's 1965,2:417-418. On Richardson as informer, see: Boston Gazette, 
26 February 1770 and 5 March 1770. Samuel Adams called Richardson an informer, «such a one as 
was never encouraged under any administration but as those of Nero and Caligula». Writings of 
Samuel Adams, 1:89-96). Richardson, Humble Confession; Richard Reeve, writing for the customs 
commission, denied that Richardson was ever employed by them (Boston Gazette, 5 March 1770). 
Nevertheless, it appears that this was simply an attempt by the authorities to distance themselves. 
Hutchinson, Massachusetts Bay, 3:193. 
1 3
 Hutchinson to Gage, 25 February 1770, Hutchinson to Hood, 23 February 1770,26 Massachusetts 
Archives, 444 ,445 ,448 . Paine's Minutes, Adams (1965, p.417); Oliver (1961, p. 84-85). 
1 4
 Sparks Manuscripts, New England Papers, 3:69. Boston Evening-Post, 20 February 1770; Virginia 
Gazette, 5 April 1770; Massachusetts Weekly Gazette and Boston Weekly Newsletter, 1 March 1770. 
Oliver, Origin and Progress, p. 85. 
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Nevertheless, as will be argued, the patriots and rioters chose to work with the 
system of official justice because they shared a common legal discourse. Through 
this discourse many Bostonians who might have rejected the idea of lynching 
Richardson in the emotional aftermath of the shooting would come to demand his 
execution. Not long after his arrest, a placard was hung on the Liberty Tree, stating 
that «thou shall take not satisfaction for the life of a murderer - he shall surely be 
put to death». The placard, of course, borrowed an apodictic biblical form in order 
to appeal to legal codes. It must be seen as a statute: publicized, like official statutes, 
and including both an authoritative injunction and a sanction 1 5. 
But the construction of vernacular legal narratives extended beyond the inven-
tion of criminal biography and the making of codes. It seized upon well-publicized 
English Wilkite cases to find legal precedents. Snider was repeatedly compared to 
Britain's Wilkite martyr William Allen: «The blood of young Allen may be cover'd 
in England», wrote a colonial radical, «but a thorough investigation will be made in 
America for that of young Snider». Such Wilkite imagery seemed especially reso-
nant to colonial Americans. Like Snider, Allen was a bystander. He was shot only a 
year earlier during the St. George's Fields Massacre of 1769 when supporters of 
Wilkes were routed while they gathered to cheer their imprisoned leader. As the 
Richardson case remained unresolved, it must have appeared increasingly similar to 
London's failure to punish the soldier who shot Allen. But it was clearly not the 
unsatisfactory verdict in the Allen case that appealed to Bostonians. Instead, the 
English case served as a precedent for a politicized reading of criminal legal 
process. Not surprisingly, then, Richardson, too, was recast as yet another typologi-
cal figure in the Anglo-American radical canon: John Porteous. 
«The conduct of freemen in one age is frequently imitated in another», warned 
a Massachusetts newspaper. «Another Porteous may fall in this country, and by an 
awful example...he that sheddeth man's blood by man shall his blood be shed». This 
appeal to Porteous' example was telling. The Porteous affair began in 1736 with the 
hanging of a smuggler in Edinburgh. Showing their displeasure at the execution, 
spectators pelted the city guard with stones and dirt. John Porteous, captain of the 
guard, responded by opening fire. Six or seven people were killed and over twenty 
wounded. Although a jury found Porteous guilty of murder and he was sentenced to 
death, his life was spared through a royal reprieve. Angered, a mob stormed the 
prison, seized Porteous, and hung him on the city gallows. What happened in 
Edinburgh during the 1730s was relevant for revolutionary Boston. The affair was 
set in the context of a struggle between Scottish autonomy and the power of the 
crown. Richardson, like Porteous, killed a rioter and somehow eluded justice. 
Interestingly, Boston radicals were mustering a variety of Anglo-American prece-
dents for vigilante action in the same way that law courts would draw upon earlier 
cases. If Porteous could be executed by extra-legal means for murder, why not 
Richardson 1 6? 
1 5
 Sparks Manuscripts, New England Papers, 3: 69; Virginia Gazette, 5 April 1770; Connecticut 
Journal and New Haven Post-Boy, 9-16 March 1770; Boston Gazette, 5 March 1770. 
16
 Massachusetts Spy, 5 March 1772. In Mercy Otis Warren's play The Adulateur: A Tragedy (Boston, 
1773), an attack on Hutchinson with classical motifs, a character named Portius - almost certainly a 
pun on Porteous - calls for revenge against Richardson. Gentleman's Magazine, 1736, p. 230 and 
1737, p. 121 and 346-7; Act of Council against Throwing Stones &c. at the Execution of Criminals 
(Edinburgh, 1737); Howell (1816-1828, 17, p. 923-994); Dickinson, Logue (1976, p. 21-40). 
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On April 20th the Richardson trial began. Since no lawyer agreed to defend him, 
the court appointed Josiah Quincy as counsel. Samuel Quincy and Robert Treat 
Paine shared the role of prosecutor. Paine's roughly sketched minutes of the trial, 
read together with the public debate over the proceedings, provide a unique oppor-
tunity to explore the differences between popular and official definitions of criminal 
law. How did the categories of official and unofficial justice differ? In what ways 
were Bostonians willing to construct their own codes? And how, ultimately, did the 
common people respond to the very different decision of the court? The major issue 
at stake was the definition of the crime - more precisely, the distinction between 
manslaughter and murder 1 7. 
Such a distinction was one of the peculiarities of official English law. French 
law, for example, treated homicide as a single crime until the Napoleonic Code. 
«I don't know of a nation in the world», a Massachusetts grand jury was told in 
1767, «that makes that distinction between murder and manslaughter which 
the English do». Following Biblical precedent, the earliest Massachusetts settlers 
failed to include manslaughter in its legal codes. Even in England, it was only in the 
late sixteenth-century that lawyers distinguished between murder, a capital crime for 
the first offense, and the less severely punished felony of manslaughter 1 8. Mans-
laughter turns upon the issue of intent. Juries were entrusted with making subtle 
judgments about the emotional state of the felon at the brief, often confused moment 
when the crime occurred. Underscoring this unusual need to weigh intent, 
Blackstone defines manslaughter as «the unlawful killing of another, without malice 
either express or implied, which may be either voluntary, upon sudden heat or invo-
luntary...it must be done without premeditation» 1 9. In Richardson's case, then, two 
questions needed to be asked. First, what was his intent at the time of the shooting ? 
And, secondly, to what extent Richardson might be permitted to raise the justifica-
tion of self-defense ? 
Richardson's defense first sought to show that he lacked any premeditated intent 
to kill Snider. In notes compiled while preparing for the trial, Josiah Quincy outlined 
the strategy for the defense: « To explain the nature of the crime of murder and the 
different kinds of homicide, as justifiable, excusable (as se defendo) and felonious: 
to show the distinction between felonious homicide of malice prepense, which is 
properly murder, and without such malice, which is manslaughter». Richardson, 
Quincy argued, acted without malice of forethought. The shooting took place in the 
heat of anger. The very fact that Snider was a bystander, struck by a stray bullet, 
shows that Richardson did not intend to kill him. Certainly, with patriot instigators 
present, Richardson must not have been aiming at an unknown schoolboy. «If A 
shoots at B, misses him and kills C» , the defense admitted «it would have been 
murder». Yet if it was true both that Richardson fired out of sudden passion and the 
1 7
 Robert Treat Paine, «Paine's Minutes of the Trial» and «Paine's Minutes of the Proceeding on the 
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1 8
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victim was not the intended one, then, according to precedent, the charge should be 
reduced to manslaughter 2 0. 
Official Anglo-American law understood malice of forethought as a specific and 
premeditated intention to harm another. Yet at the level of popular judicial discourse, 
there was no doubt that malice - more broadly defined - was behind Richardson's 
crime. As his fictive biography suggests, Richardson was thought malicious by 
nature and habit. « Urged on by hell and malice unprovoked », claimed a 1773 drama 
about Richardson, «hurled through the crowd promiscuous death and slaughter». 
Witnesses at the trial echoed this perception. They portrayed an ill-tempered, vin-
dictive man whose violent language betrayed his willingness to commit murder. 
Months before being faced with an anti-importation crowd, according to one 
witness, Richardson said «Let 'em come on me I'm ready, for I've guns loaded». 
During the course of the riot, he threatened to massacre the mob, adding «I'll make 
it too hot for you before night». Richardson showed no remorse about Snider's 
death. « Damn their blood », he was reported to have declared after the shooting, «I 
don't care what I 've done». Richardson may not have intended to slay Snider, but, it 
was thought, he clearly wanted to kill someone in the crowd. How was it possible, 
Bostonians must have wondered, not to see malice behind Richardson's act? 
Richardson was not an easy felon to defend. «Every newspaper was crowded 
with the most infamous and false libels against him in order to prejudice the minds 
of his jury ». Faced with doubts about Richardson's character, his counsel crafted an 
argument based upon self-defense. Richardson «was in his house peaceably and 
there assaulted, by breaking his windows and throwing stones at him». «It is excu-
sable homicide se defendendo », Quincy recorded in his trial notes »,...a man's house 
is his castle and he may defend it». The plea of self-defense had the advantage of 
subtly shifting the argument from Richardson's emotional state at the time of the act 
to solid facts, from the troubling persona of Richardson himself to his home. Yet the 
spatial configuration of the riot was also open to debate. What defined the bounda-
ries between house and public sphere ? Even in the midst of the riot, there was an 
engagement with the legal meaning of these boundaries. At one point, when 
Richardson ordered the rioters to disperse, they retorted « king's highway ». The pro-
testers were making a legal argument. Outside Richardson's house was, like any tho-
roughfare, public space where a demonstration may take place. Richardson did not 
agree. He threatened to make his own highway by firing his gun through the dense 
crowd 2 1 . 
The dramaturgy of the confrontation took place at the liminal space between the 
private and public. As with most anti-importation protests where houses were pelted 
with dirt, rioters resisted the temptation to forcibly enter them. In this case, 
Richardson dashed out of his home to confront the crowd, but retreated when he felt 
2 0
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threatened. This back and forth movement reflected the distinction between 
Richardson's home and the street. He «challenged them up to [the] door». The door 
as boundary repeatedly appeared in testimony at the trial. Richardson was reported 
to have said a day before the riot that violence would erupt if effigies were posted 
« before importers doors ». Acknowledging the demarcation it signified, « boys got 
to the door, threw things ». Nevertheless, this threshold remained a line that would 
not be crossed. Patriot agitators at the riot, according to the deposition of 
Richardson's daughter,«followed father up to the door and said come out you damn 
son of [a] bitch». Although the «front door [was] open, nobody had attempted to 
enter ». Only Richardson's family would testify that the door had been broken open. 
But even they did not claim rioters had barged into their home 2 2 . 
Such legal definitions of space were at the crux of Richardson's claim to self-
defense. Quincy's notes for defending Richardson show a fascination with the thre-
shold as boundary, asking « how far the attack upon the house was carried; whether 
and to what degree the windows were demolished before the firing, and whether the 
door was broken open, and any attempt made upon it; whether any actual attempt 
made to enter; or any evidence of such design from threatening words ». Windows, 
like doors, were considered openings subject to being violated. For rioters, hurling 
stones through windows may not have breached borders between Richardson's 
home and the street. Those throwing, after all, remained outside. But the evidence of 
defense witnesses suggests that broken windows could also be seen as a kind of 
forced entry. One of Richardson's daughters described the destruction of the 
window until there was « no lead, no frame » 2 3 . 
Seeking to mitigate Richardson's crime, Hutchinson also attributed a special 
significance to windows. « At length pelted and drove into his house... », Hutchinson 
wrote, « and as he says windows broken and his person in danger, he fixed upon the 
multitude and killed one lad and wounded another » 2 4 . What was the legal model for 
this association of openings with violation ? Rape and housebreaking share the same 
concern with defining the penetration of private space. Yet both demand actual entry 
for full prosecution. Bostonians who denied Richardson's claim to self-defense 
appear to have been concerned with such legal distinctions. A juror who found 
Richardson guilty of murder said he would have acquitted him «had the killing 
happened in the night instead of the day». This comment demonstrates a remark-
able appropriation of Anglo-American law. It mimics the traditional English statute 
on housebreaking which permitted the killing of a burglar in self-defense at night, 
but not during the daytime. The call for finding Richardson guilty of murder, as well 
as the claim that his crime was simply manslaughter, was rooted in a legal dis-
course 2 5 . 
«The prisoner», Richardson's judges told jurors, «was attacked in his own 
house by a number of tumultuous people in that what he had done was his own 
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defense ». These instructions to the jury made clear the bench's interpretation of the 
law: it was justifiable homicide - manslaughter, not murder 2 6. The Superior Court 
justices would later be accused of acting under the influence of politics. Yet their call 
for the jury to choose a verdict of manslaughter would have been standard for any 
similar case. In 1767, three years before Richardson was indicted, the Massachusetts 
Chief Justice's address to a grand jury dealt with the very issue of justifiable homi-
cide in the course of a riot: if a man is attacked in his «own house, whether it be to 
treat him contemptuously for the diversion and sport of those who assault him», he 
will be guilty only of manslaughter with benefit of clergy. But the bench may have 
overstepped its procedural role by urging the jury to find for manslaughter. While 
today suspects are charged prior to the trial with the appropriate category of homi-
cide, during the eighteenth century the indictment of any homicide suspect, no 
matter how mitigating the circumstances, was always murder. It was the role of the 
jury to temper the murder charge and declare the crime to be simply manslaughter 2 7. 
The jury in the Richardson case refused to cooperate. After a lengthy delibera-
tion from eleven in the evening until early the next morning, the jury returned its 
verdict on April 21st: Richardson was guilty of murder. Wilmot was found not 
guilty. When the verdict was read, spectators clapped and cheered. Peter Oliver 
noted the inversion of traditional courtroom etiquette. « At acquittals there is often a 
huzza of joy in the hall of justice; but it is singular at a conviction. But now, the 
courtroom resounded with expressions of pleasure ». The justices were faced with a 
dilemma. How should they respond to such a blatant disregard of the court's ins-
tructions? Did the jurors, as Hutchinson asked, think «themselves better judges of 
the law than the court ?». How could they «be obliged to give judgment upon a 
verdict which appeared to them directly against law ?». It «was difficult, in the state 
of the town, to order the jury out a second time, or to refuse or delay sentence after 
the verdict was received» 2 8 . In effect, two conflicting judgments had taken place: 
the manslaughter decision of the judges based upon traditional categories of official 
law and a judgment out-of-doors - encapsulated by the jury's verdict - that defined 
Richardson's crime as murder. 
Such competing legal authority evoked a major late eighteenth-century legal 
debate. Were juries simply empowered to determine the facts of a case or could they 
decide law ? The medieval criminal trial jury functioned as a witness. It determined 
the circumstances of a crime and the credibility of testimony. By the mid-seven-
teenth century, however, the increasing discretionary powers of juries was met by 
the judiciary's attempt to curb them. Bushell's Case in 1670 established the principle 
that judges cannot coerce a jury to declare a predetermined verdict. Yet for the next 
century the rights of juries remained ambiguous. While, on one hand, law was consi-
dered too complex for lay people to decide, it was also thought that overturning their 
verdicts threatened to undermine the independence of the jury. In most cases, juries 
followed advice from the court. During the 1760s, however, this debate became 
increasingly relevant. A number of English seditious libel trials with strong political 
overtones made the question of jury autonomy a watchword for Wilkites and other 
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radicals. In both Rex v. Williams (1764), which defended the publishing of Wilkes' 
North Briton, and a 1770 trial of the printers of the Junius letters, Wilkite lawyers 
based their defense upon right of juries to determine the law against instructions 
from the bench. Both cases were widely reported in the colonial press. Another case, 
Smith v. Taylor {1770), concerning a political brawl resulted in death, shared certain 
similarities with the Richardson trial. Despite the judge's determination that it was 
manslaughter, Wilkites sought a murder charge 2 9. 
John Adams linked the attempts to undermine the power of juries in both 
England and America. At the very time that Richardson's fate was debated and 
Wilkites were creating a furor in London courtrooms, another Massachusetts trial 
brought to the fore the question of whether juries had the right to decide law. John 
Mein, the contentious anti-patriot publisher of the Boston Chronicle, owed a sizable 
debt to Thomas Longman, a London merchant. For overtly political reasons, John 
Hancock initiated a lawsuit to recover the claim. The suit was a patriot ploy to harass 
Mein. Although the bench directed the jury to find for Mein, it chose to do just the 
opposite. Longman v. Mein (1770-1771) prompted the claim that eighteenth-century 
Massachusetts juries could determine questions of law. Writing in his diary at the 
time of the trial, Adams politicized the legal issue of the jury's role: «No wonder... 
that attempts are made to deprive the freeholders of America...of this troublesome 
power so dangerous to tyrants ». For Adams and other American radicals, the jury 
was invested with democratic authority. It was, in his words, «the voice of the 
people» 3 0 . 
Conflicts between judges and juries were not common. Adams estimated that in 
only one out of a thousand cases would the jury be at a loss about the law. But the 
question of a jury's right to determine law as well as fact revealed how eighteenth-
century Americans had began constructing a popular ideology of justice. It privile-
ged the experiential or intuitive wisdom of juries over the learned legal knowledge 
of judges. The juror was to be flexible, drawing upon their understanding of wit-
nesses character and local knowledge to reach a decision « according to his own best 
understanding, judgement, and conscience ». Underscoring the place of conscience 
in the jury's decision, Adams claimed that juries should not be coerced to submit a 
verdict against their will. The jury should not be made « a mere machine ». This sort 
of legal epistemology meant a radical recasting of roles. Some colonial writers even 
doubted the right of judges to interpret the law: «The opinion of a judge is respec-
table if he be an honest man, but neither the opinion of a judge or any court of justice 
2 9
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was intended to determine any issue.» «They may advise» the jury, suggested an 
anonymous 1772 essay, «but it is the finding of the jury which is the determination 
and interpretation of the law» 3 1 . 
What Adams comments suggest, then, was how differently juries might be 
perceived - and how that perception might be altered by politics. At stake was not 
simply the legal role of juries, but its place in late eighteenth-century political 
mythology. There were two conflicting understandings of the identification of 
juries with the common people. Adams thought of the jury as analogous to the 
legislature. It restrained the bench just as parliament was meant to balance the power 
of the crown. Peter Oliver, conversely, viewed the jury at Richardson's trial as 
simply an extension of the mob. «A demonocracy», Oliver called it. He accused 
Boston selectmen of stacking juries so that only those with patriot political 
sympathies would participate. Richardson, according to Oliver, « fell into the hands 
of tigers, [jurors] whose tender mercies were cruelties ». The jury foreman spoke 
with a «sullen pride of revenge». Such an accusation of vengeance struck at the 
heart of the mitigating function of the eighteenth-century criminal trial jury. Juries 
were meant to temper the punishments of a code laden with capital statutes by 
undervaluing stolen goods, what Blackstone aptly called « pious perjury », or redu-
cing charges to a clergyable offence. Yet the jury at the Richardson trial did just the 
opposite. It acted against the defendant. After the trial, one juror said that he had 
agreed to the murder charge only because «the court had delivered their opinion in 
law that the prisoner was innocent, and that his life would be saved». A significant 
inversion had taken place. Ignoring the charge from the bench, the jury demanded 
the right to punish and, ironically, left to the judges its customary task of miti-
gation 3 2. 
In their attempt to lessen Richardson's punishment, the justices followed a 
classic legal strategy: delay. They remanded him to prison, partly for his own safety. 
Richardson's defense counsel lodged a petition for a new trial; and the court, hoping 
to avoid another inflammatory legal battle, quietly consulted London about a 
pardon. The patriot press was quick to embrace Wilkite notions of the law. It argued 
that juries could judge not just fact, but law. «The notion of the jury's having no 
power to intermeddle with law is without foundation in law», protested an essay in 
the Massachusetts Spy, «it appears to me a perversion of justice and making a jury 
mere machines». « We see already the affect. A wretch, though by his country and a 
jury regularly sworn declared guilty of premeditated murder, yet lives exulting over 
the justice of his country ». The debate about Richardson's fate was both within a 
legal discourse - using courtroom idiom to argue about such questions as due 
process and the role of juries - and, at the same time, a direct challenge to legal 
authority. Richardson, Hutchinson declared, was found guilty «against the opinion 
of the court». Yet the passage quoted above revealed a very different understanding 
of authority. It offers two alternative sources of judicial power: jury and, signifi-
cantly, 'country' - or public opinion. The question «who will judge ?», was answe-
31
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red by investing not just the jury, but the common people with a previously unima-
gined legal authority33. 
In Rex v. Wemms, Justice Edmund Trowbridge instructed the jury to rely only 
upon evidence heard in court, not upon «what you may have read or heard of the 
case out of court». But during the Richardson trial, the borders between courtroom 
and street corner dissolved. Eighteenth-century courts were as much social 
constructions as architectural ones. More than anywhere else in colonial society, 
except churches, they demarcated a special place ruled by its own rituals and autho-
rity. Perhaps this was because what took place in courtrooms was laden with the 
threat of sanctioned violence. Courts, after all, had the right to expropriate wealth, 
deny liberty, or even take away a person's life. This awesome power, bounded by 
rules, was reflected in the architecture of the Superior Court chamber. It was, accor-
ding to John Adams' evocative description, «as respectable an apartment as the 
House of Commons or the House of Lords in Great Britain, in proportion, or that in 
the State House in Philadelphia». The physical setting was dominated by the jus-
tices. «Round a great fire, were seated five judges...arrayed in their new, fresh, rich 
robes of scarlet English broadcloth; in their large cambric bands, and immense judi-
cial wigs». This dignity, «more solemn and pompous than that of the Roman 
Senate», underscored the well-staged distinctions between court ritual and extra-
legal crowd action 3 4. 
Instituted by Hutchinson in 1762, judicial robes were a novelty for Massa-
chusetts Superior Court. Such trappings of power demonstrated not the hegemony 
of law courts, but the need to bolster waning power. A few years later, Hutchinson 
would elaborate upon sustaining the authority of the Superior Court: «'Tis on the 
dignity and support of the executive courts that your own liberty depends. Let the 
respect of these courts be lost, let their dignity not be kept up... and all order and 
government will soon be at end. For what order can there be in a society where the 
courts which are to carry the laws in execution are treated with a contemptuous dis-
respect ?». Faced with rising discord, two years later New York's justices, William 
Smith, Daniel Horsmanden, and Robert Livingston, would also require gowns to 
create «dignity, authority, solemnity, and decorum». But robes do not make the 
judge. In a satirical play published in Boston, Justice Beau has to duck into his 
chambers to put on a robe before taking a deposition. «Be sure», says the vain 
justice, «to see my Whig is combed and powdered». The use of robes may not have 
ensured deference. It did, however, reflect Hutchinson's hierarchical vision of 
justice: while robed justices rendered decisions in well-appointed courtrooms, 
unruly common people were best consigned to Boston's tumultuous streets 3 5. 
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Yet Richardson's case brought the crowd into the courtroom. A vast number of 
spectators gathered to hear the proceedings. «The authority of the courts», wrote 
Peter Oliver, «were now of little force. Forms were maintained without much 
power». Nowhere can this better be seen than during the instructions to the jury. 
From Justice Oliver came a statement assigning broader guilt to patriot leaders. He 
«charged the death of the boy upon the promoters of effigies and other exhibitions 
which had drawn the people together and caused unlawful tumultuous assem-
blies» 3 6 . Such a statement from the bench meant that Oliver took advantage of the 
presence of another patriot crowd to «charge » them (the use of legal language is 
significant) with the crime. When the bench unanimously called upon the jury to 
reduce the crime to manslaughter, anger flared. «No manslaughter, but murder», 
Bostonians shouted at the departing jurors, «remember jury you are upon oath -
blood requires blood». The crowd chose to deliver their own instructions to the jury. 
This charge, like the official one read from the bench, centered around the distinc-
tion between manslaughter and murder, and jurors' responsibility in framing a 
verdict. When the jury decided that Richardson was guilty of murder, the spectators 
cheered. Richardson himself was whisked away to jail in order to prevent his being 
lynched. He would spend the next twenty-two months in prison awaiting a pardon. 
Prompted by what the defense considered intimidation of the jury, a motion for a 
new trial was quickly filed. This troubled case, clearly, would not set any official 
legal precedent. Nevertheless, it marked a watershed in the popular wresting away 
of judicial power. Almost every step of the affair Bostonians would declare judge-
ments, craft fictive criminal narratives, search for precedents, decide questions of 
law, or charge a jury 3 7 . 
* 
* * 
While Ebenezer Richardson languished in prison, Levi Ames pursued his crimi-
nal career. Ames did not need anyone to invent past felonies for him. From his ear-
liest childhood, Ames led a life punctuated by crime. Beginning with minor thefts, a 
couple of eggs, a pocket knife, and some chalk, he quickly graduated to robbery as 
a profession. Like Richardson, Ames had a verse broadside that justified his execu-
tion: «No goods were safe that you could steal/How many doors you've open 
broke/And windows scal'd and money took/Round houses you have all day been/To 
spy a place to enter in». « Death and damnation », adds the poem called The Speech 
of Death to Levi Ames, is your due» 3 8 . Such verse dying speeches, the execution 
sermons preached by Boston ministers, and his long, rambling execution narrative 
would leave no doubt that Ames - in ways that might never apply to Richardson -
was an old offender. 
Born at Groton in 1752, Ames was only twenty-one years old when sentenced to 
death. His father, Jacob Ames, died when he was age two. This loss seems to have 
3 6
 Hutchinson to Hillsborough, 21 April 1770,26 Massachusetts Archives, 463. Unfortunately, a survi-
ving diary from one of the justices sheds little light on the workings of the bench in this case: 
Benjamin Lynde, Jr. (1880, p. 194-195). 
3 7
 Oliver (1961, p. 86) and Adams (1965,2, p. 404-405 and 426-427). 
3 8
 Ames, The Speech of Death to Levi Ames [broadside]. 
CRIMINAL L A W A N D C O N S T I T U T I O N A L NARRATIVES I N REVOLUTIONARY B O S T O N 47 
determined much of his early life. Finding herself unable to discipline her child, 
Ames' mother contracted an apprenticeship agreement. Ames ran away from his 
master. This, he admitted, was the beginning of his ruin. «For being indolent in 
temper and having no honest ways of supporting myself, I robbed others of their 
property». Richardson was emblematic of the kind of scoundrel who would do any-
thing for his master. He was, in late eighteenth-century idiom, a creature of the 
customs commissioners - willing to lie, inform, or even murder at their bidding. But 
Ames represented another bete noire of colonial Americans, the masterless man 
who wandered freely without norms imposed by social superiors 3 9. 
Not surprisingly, then, Ames' execution narrative was constructed around the 
motif of motion. It was a sort of felon's progress, a grand larceny tour making its 
way across much of New England. Thefts were marked by where they took place: 
Waltham, Cambridge, Lexington, Natick, Boston, Marlborough, Watertown, 
Newburyport, or Worcester. Ames' crimes traversed three colonies, Connecticut, 
Rhode Island, and, especially, Massachusetts. After one arrest, he wandered like 
Cain with a mark. Ames' forehead was branded with a « B » for burglary. Ironically, 
Ames began his tale of theft at Richardson's home town: Woburn. There he stole a 
gun from Josiah Richardson, probably a relative of Ebenezer. Quickly moving on, 
Ames stole twenty to thirty dollars at Plymouth, broke into a dry goods store at 
Groton where he took some cloth, and robbed two Waltham men of money and a hat. 
Yet even such petty thefts as the hat were accompanied by the name of the 
victim. Ames' memory of his robberies was remarkable. «I stole», he acknowled-
ged, « a pair of silver buckles and a pair of turned pumps out of a pair of saddle bags 
at Leason's tavern in Waltham; the buckles were marked I.D.». Part of the purpose 
of the execution narrative was to inform victims of what happened to missing items. 
Ames' ability to identify what was stolen, where, and from whom makes his narra-
tive read like a crime blotter. The inventory of loot taken from a Lexington home, for 
example, included a tankard, twelve tea-spoons, a pepper-box, and two pair of sugar 
tongs. Only rarely does he admit to a lapse in memory. «I have several times taken 
sundry articles off of lines, hedges, fences, bushes apple trees...», Ames confessed, 
« but I cannot recollect their owners » 4 0 . 
Ames' narrative provides a fascinating window into the life of a late eighteenth-
century petty criminal. Many of his robberies were opportunistic. He might find an 
unwatched basket of small coins at a baker's, an axe left carelessly in the back of a 
cart. When he took a horse, it was only in order to quickly slip out of town. It was a 
life marked by close escapes, sudden changes of dress - «I also stole... two coats and 
jackets with which I dressed myself when I came to Boston» - or even of name. «I 
then went», Ames wrote, «by the name of Isna Lawrence». Ames would sell his 
stolen goods to fences or peddle it himself. At times he must have missed a decent 
meal. While robbing a house at Marlborough, he searched for something to eat. 
3 9
 Levi Ames, The Life, Last Words, and Dying Speech of Levi Ames (Boston, 1773), p. 31. Boston 
Post-Boy, 25 September 1773. Although little work has been done on the connection between age 
and crime, Ames fits a pattern for youth offenders. See Davis (1971, p. 41-75) and Smith (1973, 
p. 149-161). Demographic data like that of Wrigley and Schofield (1981) would establish if the colo-
nies, as well as England, was experiencing a rapid rise in the number of adolescents during this 
period. 
4 0
 Ames, Life, p. 31-33. Minute Book of the Superior Court of Judicature, 1773-1774, 30-31, 
Massachusetts Archives (Boston). 
48 S T E V E N W I L F 
Ames seems anything but threatening. Shunning armed robbery, he limited himself 
to small time pilfering and burglary. A number of his burglaries were committed on 
Sunday when there was less chance of encountering violence 4 1. 
In his fictive verse confession, Richardson was portrayed as acknowledging ter-
rible crimes: perjury, adultery, incest, and murder. Yet the broadside poem justifying 
Ames' execution was hardly able to summon anything worse than bad habits. Death, 
portrayed as a skeleton, demanded the right to take Ames: «In adding guilt you still 
went on/I doubly claim you for my own/How often you the Sabbath broke !/God's 
name in vain you often took!/ A filthy drunkard you have been/And led your life 
with the unclean». Ames was not an heroic eighteenth-century criminal like Jack 
Shepherd or Jonathan Wild. No ballads would be written about Levi Ames. Often he 
was timid. If his execution narrative can be believed, Ames repaid certain of his 
victims. He refused to act as a fence for an associate because he «was afraid to do 
it». When another thief tried to lure him into robbing the Governor's house, he decli-
ned. There were too many servants and Ames would have to go armed. «This I abso-
lutely refuse because I never thought of murdering any man in the midst of all my... 
thieving». Unlike Richardson, no one would accuse Ames of murder 4 2. 
Such strategic moves suggest that Ames had a hand in crafting his own execu-
tion narrative. Scholars have often envisioned such narratives as an instrument of 
the authorities for communicating a message of civil order. Nevertheless, felons 
commonly seized upon the genre as a means to tell their own story. Ames was no 
exception. His narrative must be read like a pardon petition. It self-servingly empha-
sized his best moments: repaying stolen goods, his stance against violence, and 
Ames' claim to repentence. «Though I lived such a wicked life», Ames wrote, «it 
was not without some severe checks. For after I had stolen, I have been so distressed 
at times, as to be obliged to go back and throw the stolen goods at the door, or into 
the yard that the owners might have them again». Shortly before his last arrest, 
Ames claimed he felt the burden of his criminal life: «I passed the gallows on 
Boston neck with some stolen goods under my arm when my conscience terribly 
smote me, and I thought I should surely die there, if I did not leave off this course of 
life». The execution narrative was a platform for Ames to make his final pleas. 
Richardson's mock dying confession was fabricated to use against his being pardo-
ned. But Ames, who retained some control over his own narrative, reinvented his 
criminal self with the hope of a last minute reprieve 4 3. 
Ames was sentenced to death for a crime not too different from others in his 
past: a simple burglary. It was planned with a confederate, Joseph Attwood, who 
Ames claimed he met for the first time in Boston towards the end of August, 1773, 
shortly before attempting the burglary together. Here, again, was an example of 
Ames's selective memory. It appears that Ames and Attwood had broken into the 
house of a Lexington minister the previous spring 4 4. Turning king's evidence against 
Ames, Attwood would later provide the testimony that would lead to Ames' capital 
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conviction. Not surprisingly, then, Ames and Attwood had very different versions of 
their meeting. According to Attwood, Ames took him to dinner, plied him with 
wine, and told him that he had seen Martin Bicker return home from his auction 
house with a large sum of money. They walked from Market Square to the North 
End, and Ames tried to convince Attwood to join him in the theft. At the ship yards, 
the two slept a bit. Ames took a bottle from his pocket. While drinking still more, 
Attwood finally succumbed to Ames' coaxing 4 5. 
Ames told the story differently: «I was standing at a countryman's cart in the 
market at Boston, asking the price of a turkey; Attwood came up to me and we fell 
into conversation». Attwood and Ames walked up Beacon Hill. Attwood, Ames 
claimed, said he had no money and Ames offered him dinner. Ames convinced 
Attwood to fence some stolen goods. Then, in Ames' version of the story, it was 
Attwood who first suggested robbing Bicker's house: «he told me he knew of 
[someone]... who had a large sum of money by him, and if I would join him we 
would get it». Ames' description clearly attempts to shift the blame to Attwood. 
Tucked away in the midst of his execution narrative, it appears to be simply another 
straight-forward tale of crime. But Ames was doing more than unburdening his 
conscience before he dies. He had survived other convictions for burglary without 
suffering death. His narrative, must be seen as an extra-official species of testimony. 
A witness in his own defense, Ames followed the strategy of trying to create enough 
doubt about Attwood's evidence to prompt a pardon for himself46. 
Such pleas stood squarely within a legal discourse. Nowhere was this clearer 
than in the description of the crime itself. « Having come to Mr. Bicker's house », 
stated Ames, « we found a front chamber window open; we pulled off our shoes, and 
Joseph Attwood with my assistance climbed up to the window and entered the 
house, and opened the doors for me; we then went together to the desk which we 
broke open with the chisels ». They stole forty pieces of silver, Spanish pieces of 
eight, and gold coins. Attwood's testimony was very different. He claimed that 
Ames supplied the instruments and climbed into a window while he waited outside 
and served merely as a lookout. Under the guise of making peace as he approached 
death, Ames pointedly underscored the fact that he insisted that Attwood had lied 
under oath. «I also forgive from my heart Joseph Attwood », Ames wrote in his nar-
rative, «who swore on my trial that I entered the house of Mr. Bicker first, and let 
him in, when he knows in his conscience that he entered first and let me in » 4 7 . 
What Ames and Attwood disagreed about, of course, was the same issue as 
found in the Richardson case: the spatial configuration of the crime. Even as non-
lawyers, they showed themselves aware of the legal definition of housebreaking. At 
issue was the actual entry into the house, which was the statutory characterization of 
the felony, not simply the theft of goods. While Ames blamed Attwood for the first 
illegal entry, Attwood denied entering at all. The money was found on both of them 
when captured. But it was windows and doors that once again proved significant as 
liminal structures. Although Ames pleaded not guilty, the court believed Attwood. 
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On Friday, September 10th, 1773 Ames was sentenced to death for burglary. His 
execution was set for October 14th. Attwood, who was found guilty in part, would 
receive twenty stripes, and pay triple damages and costs. Unable to pay, Attwood 
was placed at Bicker's disposal for ten years 4 8. 
Ames hoped for a pardon. The Sunday before the execution, a Baptist minister 
cautioned: « All prospect of living longer than the time appointed is cut off. I hope 
you will not flatter yourself with a longer time ». Yet Ames, not unreasonably, relied 
upon the capriciousness of the eighteenth-century criminal justice system with its 
frequent reprieves. Like the execution narrative, his behavior must be seen as a sort 
of legal document - an acted, rather than written, petition for a pardon. Ames tried 
to be a model prisoner. He expressed appreciation towards the people of Boston, 
ministers, and the jail keeper. « Levi Ames », wrote a Boston diarist, « attends public 
worship every Sabbath and infinite pains is taken by the ministers of the town to 
enlighten his mind in the knowledge of divine truth ». As was the case with many 
condemned felons, Ames' life assumed a typological significance. Overlaid upon 
the criminal self of the execution biography was a protestant redemptive narrative 4 9. 
Once again, language played a critical role in inventing and reinventing the 
meaning of a criminal life. Richardson's language was provocative. According to a 
contemporary, he was « a rough speaker, and a passionate man...[who] insulted his 
opponent in gross terms ». It was not easy to be a supporter of the crown in revolu-
tionary Boston. Richardson voiced the unspoken bitterness of his embattled patrons. 
On the other hand, Ames cannily adopted the idiom of deference towards those who 
held the power to pardon. Claiming to be contrite, Ames tried the classic gambit of 
felons: how could he face God's judgement without having the opportunity for a few 
more good deeds? «I feel I am lost», he told a minister. «I sometimes think that I 
am given over to destruction, and that there is no mercy for me. I am undone in soul 
and body. If I go to the place of execution as I am now, they must drag me like a 
bullock to the slaughter ». Such comments contained a threat. The representational 
meaning of the execution could be remade into slaughter. Ames added the inevitable 
plea: «May I not have a little longer time than is now fixed?» Perhaps because of 
his penitent stance, perhaps because of the public outcry over the sentence of death, 
Ames was allowed a one week reprieve. Then, on October 21st, with an exceptio-
nally large number of spectators present, Ames was hanged 5 0. 
The execution of Levi Ames turned into something of a cottage industry for 
Boston printers. During the course of the next month and a half, a flurry of poems, 
broadsides, dying speeches, and execution narratives and sermons would be publi-
shed. What this collection of works reveals is the diversity of tropes that might be 
applied to a single criminal life. The execution sermons of ministers Samuel 
Stillman, Andrew Elliot, and Samuel Mather, not surprisingly, drew upon Protestant 
motifs. According to Stillman, Ames was Absalom, the beloved son who went 
astray. Eliot described Christ on the cross with thieves. For Mather, God was a phy-
sician prepared to heal Ames on his deathbed. Ames was promised mercy if he 
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repented, judgement if he did not. «All heaven is purchas'd by His cross/ For such 
vile souls as thine », intoned an execution broadside full of religious imagery, «You 
leave this earth, it is no loss/If you in heaven may shine». Mixing Christian morals 
with civil authority, Stillman used the execution sermon as a forum to denounce 
deism, excessive drinking, gambling, and seducers who threaten the honor of 
women. Ames was a bit more prosaic when he listed his own last warnings. Parents 
and masters should discipline children. Beware, he cautioned, of bad women, 
cursing, and drunkeness. Stepping beyond the confines of Protestant execution 
sermon conventions, Ames offered some practical advice: «To keep your doors and 
widows shut on evenings, and secured well to prevent temptation. And by no means 
use small locks on the outside, one of which I have twisted when ease when tempted 
to steal. Also not to leave linen or clothes out at night». « Travelers », he added », I 
advise to secure their saddle bags, boots etc. in the chambers where they lodge ». 
The number and variety of execution texts about Ames seems astonishing. After 
all, Ames was not very different from many other petty criminals who plagued the 
colonies during the 1760s and 1770s. He did not perform any spectacular escapes, 
lead a gang of felons, or even commit murder. Why, then, was Ames the subject of 
so many works ? The answer, once again, leads back to Ebenezer Richardson and the 
political context of revolutionary Boston. Sentencing Ames to death for burglary 
contrasted with the failure to punish Richardson for the more serious crime of 
murder. Richardson remained in prison for almost two years. London had sent one 
pardon, but uneasy about the technical details of the form and perhaps fearing 
unrest, Hutchinson requested another. By spring 1772, the Newgate pardon finally 
came. On March 12th, Richardson was secretly released from confinement 5 1. Just a 
few months later, an inflammatory broadside entitled Theft and Murder conjured up 
the sight of Ames hanging on the scaffold while Richardson went free: «Come ye 
spectators, and behold/And view a doleful scene today/My tender fainting heart 
grows cold/And I am fill'd with sore dismay... Behold a man condemn'd to die/For 
stealing his neighbor's goods/But murder doth for vengeance cry/But where's the 
avenger of the blood ». 
Theft and Murder placed itself within the genre of execution poetics. Like many 
other examples of the genre, its frontpiece depicted the scene of execution. In ste-
reotypic fashion, Ames was shown suspended from the gallows. Hovering above 
him stood a hangman on a ladder, while below a man on horseback appears to be 
issuing orders. Yet the message was radical: «Tis a great crime to steal from 
men/And punishment deserves indeed/But murd'rers have released been/Who made 
our friends promiscuous bleed». The broadside incorporated Christian motifs. But 
these were more like those of Snider's martyrology than those found in Ames' exe-
cution sermons. As after Cain's murder of Abel, the victim's blood calls from the 
ground. The popular culture of execution narratives mingled with an attack on the 
fairness of English law. This was not a full American critique of the English crimi-
nal justice system - that would wait until the 1780s. Nor was the issue of class, 
which would become so important in the 1790s, yet raised in a truly conscious way. 
Nevertheless, Americans were clearly sensitive to the injustice of capital punish-
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ment for crimes against property at the same time that murder might be pardoned. 
« The life of man is more than gold/Or any other earthly good/But thieves are hang'd 
while murderers bold/ Are freed » 5 2 . 
«Must thieves who take men's good away/Be put to death», asked the anony-
mous author of this broadside, «while fierce blood hounds/Who do their fellow 
creatures slay/Are sav'd from death ?» «This cruel sounds». Theft and Murder 
demanded a pardon for Ames. A newspaper article signed by Brutus compared 
England's robbery of the colonies with Ames' small scale pilfering. «He that riots 
on the plunder of his country deserves the gallows more than he that robs an indivi-
dual». Such patriot arguments would not go unanswered. Two other verse broad-
sides defended capital punishment for burglary. A burglar not only stole 
possessions, but peace of mind. An Address to the Inhabitants of Boston appealed to 
the fears of the city's hard-working citizens: «Industrious man o'ercome with sleep 
retires/Thinks to enjoy what he desires/The time that nature ordained for rest/When 
all the living may with sleep be blessed». Yet even as the working man rests, bur-
glars like Ames are plotting their thefts. «Then at this hour the felon strikes/When 
all in sleep are lost/But crafty thieves who live at others cost» 5 3 . 
With such arguments, the Address to the Inhabitants of Boston deflected the 
claim that English law was primarily concerned with the defense of property. Life, 
too, was at risk during a night time burglary. «Thro' fear of death he [the househol-
der] dares not descend/Lest that the night in blood and slaughter end». The poem 
depicts the next morning when the victim, obviously distressed, surveys what has 
been stolen. It suggests that the only deterrent to such a crime was the example of 
capital punishment. The political debate, then, over English criminal law was 
couched in the vernacular form of execution literature. In a dying speech, attributed 
to Ames, the felon himself complained about the politicization of his fate: « bab-
bling gossips » will tell his tale. Nevertheless, what is so striking in this case is the 
appropriation of a common felon's tale in the course of a wide-ranging legal debate 
about the character of criminal law. Like many offenders, Ames was described 
through a garden variety of tropes, such as Christianity's penitent thief or the prodi-
gal son. But as placing blame spilled over from his singular case to a critique of the 
English legal system, Ames himself underwent a transfiguration. He became the 
thematic counterpoint to Richardson 5 4. 
In the Richardson affair, as well, Bostonians turned to the innovative use of ver-
nacular legal culture. The court had declared that Richardson committed justifiable 
homicide. Pardoned by the crown, official legal process set him free. Richardson 
was, to borrow a phrase from Peter Oliver, found, «guiltless in law». Yet that was 
not the verdict of extra-official justice. The common people of Boston judged 
Richardson guilty of murder. An «infamous murderer », newspapers and broadsides 
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called Richardson. «The guilty, guilty murderer walks abroad» 5 5 . Unable to hang 
Richardson in person, Bostonians at least chose to do so in their imagination. A 
broadside entitled The Humble Confession of Richardson imitated the conventions 
of the capital felon's dying speech. Along the upper border was a typical wood-cut 
illustration of the crime, depicting a street scene with Lillie's store clearly marked 
and the gathering crowd. A long, smoking rifle barrel extends from a second story 
window. It began with the formulaic prologue of the last confession: «Injured 
Boston now awake/While I a true confession make/Of my notorious sins and 
guilt/As well as the harmless blood I've spilt». In this fictive dying speech, 
Richardson admits to having been both an adulterer and an informer. Yet these are 
small crimes compared to murder. «But what's all that to this last crime/In sending 
Seider out of time !/This cuts my heart, this frights me most/O help me, Lord, I see 
his ghost». From the last lines of the confession, it appears that the broadside was 
used with an effigy. Presumably, the effigy would be hanged with all the ritual and 
pageantry of official justice. « And now my injur'd friends/Since I can make you no 
amends », the Richardson figure urged, «Here is my body you may take» 5 6 . 
While the stuffed Richardson figure may have been executed, the real Richardson 
upon receiving his pardon from London was quickly spirited out of town. Here, too, 
Bostonians drew upon the forms of popular legal culture. They drafted a mock 
advertisement for him of the sort used for wanted criminals. «The infamous 
Ebenezer Richardson», its headline blazoned, «convicted of perjury & murder» 
was rumored to have fled to Philadelphia. « Richardson rioting in the spoils of his 
country, lurks about the wharves of this city, seeking an opportunity to distress the 
trade of Philadelphia and enslave America ». Like any proper notice for an outlaw, it 
included a full description: « The above Richardson appears to be a man of 46 years 
of age is about five feet four or five inches high, pretty thick and broad across the 
shoulders, has a very ill countenance and down look, pits-burnt cut wig, and a blue 
surtout coat with metal buttons » 5 7 . 
No court reporter recorded Richardson's trial. Yet literary and artistic represen-
tations, including theater, prints, and poetry, meant that they entered into popular 
memory. More than a year after the riot in front of Richardson's house, Paul Revere 
constructed a transparent painting not of the scene itself, but of Snider's ghost in the 
same pose as when he was wounded. A couplet underneath read: « Seider's [sic] 
pale ghost fresh bleeding stands/And vengeance for his death demands ». In some 
ways, the specter of the case was more important than either Richardson or Snider 
themselves. « Young Seider's blood from th' op'ning ground cries justice, justice -
here thee sound ». The infamous murderer Richardson was released, went a demand 
for remembrance published in 1772, «tell this in Britain, publish it in Ireland, may 
America remember it forever ». 
These small pieces echoed any number of Biblical commonplaces. In them lies 
a code which can be deciphered when juxtaposed to their Biblical source. « Justice, 
justice », any literate colonial would know, referred to the passage in Deuteronomy 
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which attacks bribing judges, a probable reference to the judicial salary dispute. The 
Biblical quote «justice, justice pursue » predicates living in the land of Israel upon 
following basic principles of justice. What this evokes, of course, is a Puritan histo-
rical conceit: Massachusetts settlers are Israelites, America the promised land. « Tell 
this in Britain, publish it in Ireland » must be read as a text against David's eulogy of 
Saul and Jonathan who were murdered by the Philistines. David demanded «Tell it 
not in Gath, Do not proclaim it in the streets of Ashkelon ». Here the English take the 
pose of the enemies of Israel, the Philistines. But in this case, unlike the Biblical 
passage, the anonymous colonial polemicist wants the English/Philistines to admit 
their own crimes. Finally, the most potent recurring Biblical trope was that of Cain 
and Abel. Cain and Abel were brothers, Richardson and Snider both countrymen. 
Snyder's blood, like Abel's cries from the opening ground. The blood of Snider 
«crieth out for vengeance like the blood of righteous Abel». Richardson borrows 
Cain's visage, «a very ill countenance and down look». The murdered Abel's 
marking is blood. As with Cain, Richardson was not executed. Instead, he was 
marked. «I believe», wrote a colonial, Richardson is «suffering Cain's punish-
ment». For Cain and for Richardson, the marking was exclusion, exile, and 
58 
memory58. 
Richardson and Ames were not the only ones tried on the streets of Boston. 
Having pardoned a murderer and chosen to execute a petty thief, the court was 
judged as well. Massachusetts Superior Court had been unpopular for much of the 
last decade. In 1761-2, the court sanctioned writs of assistance, broadly defined 
search warrants employed by customs officers. It further alienated the population 
through supporting the Stamp Act and adjourning the court when faced with popular 
pressure. The people of Boston, Hutchinson wrote in 1765, «will oblige all judges 
to observe their orders or quit their places» 5 9 . Alarmed by a court that actively but-
tressed English authority, the legislature curbed judicial salaries. Towards the end of 
the 1760s, the crown adopted a strategy of trying to shift influence over the judiciary 
from the legislature to the executive. Judicial salaries were now paid by the royal 
authorities and appointments to the bench were based largely upon political consi-
derations. At the beginning of 1772, the resignation of two justices, John Cushing 
and Benjamin Lynde, created vacancies on the Superior Court. Peter Oliver was 
named chief justice and Nathanial Ropes became an associate justice. 
Both Oliver and Ropes were considered loyal supporters of the royal govern-
ment. Oliver's brother, Andrew, was a stamp distributor. The same year as his 
appointment to the court, Oliver participated in the unpopular investigation into the 
destruction of the Gaspee, a navy schooner assigned to stem smuggling in 
Narragansett Bay. Demonstrating firm commitment to London, Ropes lost his 
Council seat in 1769. Yet it was the issue of the judges' salaries that led to massive 
agitation against the Superior Court. Bostonians accused justices of being blinded 
by bribery and beholden to the Crown. «Base and mercenary wretches», wrote one 
newspaper, « fill the bench of justice, who will throw off all the restraint of law and 
give judgement according to the direction of their masters » 6 0 . As early as 1770, a 
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placard was posted on the door of the town hall attacking the justices of the Superior 
Court. During the summer of 1773, barely a few months before Ames was hanged 
for burglary, the Massachusetts House of Assembly demanded that judges refuse the 
Crown grant or face impeachment. Boston mobs intimidated justices into signing a 
renunciation. Only Peter Oliver defied these threats. Impeachment proceedings 
were initiated and there was a movement to boycott jury duty on a court that many 
felt was no longer legitimate. Fearing that he might be attacked, Oliver absented 
himself from the bench. Without Oliver, the court failed to fulfill its duties 6 1. 
Such popular disaffection with the judiciary, then, must be seen as the context for 
the debate over the contrasting fates of Richardson and Ames. The presiding judge 
for both trials was Peter Oliver. Not surprisingly, Bostonians echoed the tone of the 
judicial salary dispute and argued that the outcome of Richardson's trial was deter-
mined by politics. « Political motives », it was suggested, «influenced a delay in jud-
gement and execution of this criminal». Quincy warned that if « political views » 
should ever shape the decisions of judges, « who have the lives, liberty and property 
of us all in their power, society is worse than a state of nature ». Mary Otis Warren's 
satiric drama on the Hutchinson administration, The Adulateur, again raised the 
notion of political corruption as the basis for any pending pardon of Richardson: 
« You know who fills that sacred bench... mere creatures of the tyrant [Hutchinson]. 
Depend upon it, they'll vilely wrest the law, and save the villain [Richardson] - yes 
depend upon it». The term «wrest» clearly alludes both to its meaning as altering 
interpretation and to the image of seizing the law - away from the people? - and 
taking posession of it by force. «Should he be brought before that bribed tribunal, 
they'll plead his case, and save the murderer's life». Following the classic literary 
inversion of the justice as criminal, Warren adds «I 've seen such crimes by ermined 
wretches as would have shock'd a century » 6 2 . 
More than any other legal proceedings, criminal justice should be the least affec-
ted by politics. The protection of citizens from criminals, after all, was considered 
by eighteenth-century legal theorists as fundamental for every society. Yet accor-
ding to contemporaries, precisely because Richardson's case was criminal it establi-
shed the right of the people to judge the legal system. «When a breach of criminal 
law is made, it is the public who are injured by the infraction... shall the injured not 
call for redress ?». Bostonians portrayed Richardson as a criminal offender shielded 
for political reasons. By pardoning a murderer, the court sanctioned the greatest of 
felonies. The Superior Court, declared a town meeting at Sandwich, has been «ren-
dered dependent on those who rob and murder us». Law would lose its legitimacy, 
if people « perceive the destruction of their fellow citizens is treated as a slight thing 
and blood, innocent blood, crimsoning their city » 6 3 . 
As with his trial, Richardson's confinement and pardon prompted legal issues 
that overflowed from the courtroom to the popular press. Was it right, for example, 
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that Richardson should be held in prison so long without being either executed or 
released as innocent? What law justified this breach of habeas corpus. Many 
Bostonians, of course, wanted Richardson hanged, not freed. But Richardson's 
extended confinement, a legal netherland, provoked questions about the role of 
prisons. Prior to the rise of penitentiaries in the 1780s, their use as an instrument of 
punishment remained controversial. One newspaper article adopted the traditional 
stance towards prisons as simply way stations and chided the criminal justice system 
for letting Richardson languish in jail : « A jail was never intended for punishment, 
but only to hold the debtor till he fulfilled his voluntary contracts; the suspected till 
his offence could be conveniently ascertained; and the convicted till speedy justice 
could be executed ». The administration of justice, it warned, retains its integrity by 
being swift and without hesitation. Imprisoning Richardson only to await a pardon, 
shows a « secret cunning » and such conduct injustices is «base, odious, and exe-
crable» 6 4 . 
«Ebenezer Richardson remains alive», complained one Bostonian, «to insult 
and defy the avengers of blood to obtain of him the least satisfactions. And this 
unaccountable political phenomenon is solved only by the extension of the ancient 
notion of benefit of clergy » 6 5 . The New England colonies had long been troubled by 
the idea of benefit of clergy. It seemed obscure, an arbitrary form of pardon, and 
overly Catholic. Benefit of clergy traced its origins from the right of clerics to the 
separate jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts. As the use of separate courts shifted to 
the practice of trying clergymen in the same court as laymen, clerics were provided 
with a special privilege, benefit of clergy, which protected them from capital punish-
ment. The classic test for identifying a cleric was the ability to read. By the four-
teenth century, benefit of clergy was extended to anyone demonstrating minimal 
literacy. Ultimately, it came to be used as a general form of pardon that provided a 
way for courts to temper the many capital statutes found in English criminal codes. 
«An unreasonable exemption of popish ecclesiastics», Blackstone claimed, was 
gradually transformed «into a merciful mitigation of the general law with respect to 
capital punishment» 6 6 . 
Yet patriot lawyers increasingly considered benefit of clergy a remnant of 
cannon and feudal forms that England imposed upon the colonies. It only entered 
Massachusetts codes in 1686 during the much hated anglicizing governorship of 
Edmund Andros. After the Revolution, Massachusetts law would quickly move to 
dismantle benefit of clergy as, in the words of the 1785 repealing act, «originally 
founded in superstition and injustice » 6 7 . A verse broadside mocked Richardson's 
pardon by benefit of clergy: « Oh! Wretched man! The monster of the times/You 
were not hung by 'reason of old lines'/Old lines thrown by/'twas then we were in 
hopes/That you would soon be hung with new made ropes ». Once again, the coun-
terpoint of Ames' fate must have underscored the arbitrariness of benefit of clergy. 
Just a few years before Ames was convicted, in 1770, a new Massachusetts statute 
removed burglary as a clergyable offence. Enacted in the midst of a crime wave and 
6 4
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replacing a more mild 1715 law, it was cast in the model of England's harsher 
criminal code. « However rigorously the laws may be executed against indifferent 
offenders », went the complaint, «it seems to be laid down as a fixed maxim that no 
murderer shall suffer during the present reign, if he has even the remotest connec-
tion with the servants of the king». Bostonians must have marveled that a murderer 
could be pardoned with benefit of clergy while that loophole was now closed to a 
burglar like Ames 6 8 . 
There was yet another contradiction between the fate of Richardson and Ames 
that would have troubled Bostonians. According to the English murder act of 1752, 
murderers, not any other felons, would suffer dissection «to add some further terror 
and peculiar mark of infamy... to the punishment of death». The act was, in fact, 
intended to distinguish lesser capital crimes such as burglary from murder. No sta-
tutory basis yet existed for dissection as a form of punishment in the colonies, that 
innovation would come with a flurry of laws in the late 1780s and early 1790s, but 
colonial Americans were well aware of its punitive role. In the streets of Boston 
Richardson was judged guilty of murder. He nevertheless escaped not simply the 
gallows, but the surgeons as well. Yet Ames, though simply convicted of house-
breaking, was threatened by dissection. 
Historians have shown how much eighteenth-century Anglo-Americans feared 
the surgeons. Not just at London's Tyburn, where the common people frequently 
rioted to retrieve the bodies of hanged criminals, but also in America dissection was 
seen as a worse fate than the gallows. During a 1771 riot at Worcester, an angry 
crowd rescued the corpse of a hanged felon from dissection. Ames, too, appeared to 
share that fear. Probably one reason for the special relationship formed between 
Ames and the minister who cared for him as a condemned prisoner, Rev. Samuel 
Stillman, was that Ames hoped Stillman would protect him from the surgeons. 
Three parties contended for Ames' body after the execution: established doctors, 
including James Lloyd and John Clarke, under the direction of Dr. John Jefferies, a 
coterie of young medical students at Harvard, and a rescue party employed by 
Stillman. Hutchinson, in fact, was ready to order the corpse handed over to Jefferies 
when Stillman intervened. Much to the disappointment of the competing anato-
mists, Stillman secretly buried Ames at Dorcester Point. Nevertheless, Bostonians 
must have been struck by the irony of how different were the fates of Richardson 
and Ames. Hutchinson was willing to sanction Ames' dismemberment 6 9. 
* 
* * 
What lessons, then, do we learn from these two remarkable cases? Placing 
blame meant not only finding an individual felon culpable, but a critical reading of 
the legal apparatus-and its English constitutional underpinnings-as well. It seems 
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clear that the street, as much as the courtroom, was the locus of this interpretive 
understanding of criminal and constitutional narratives. The debate over the justice 
of Richardson's pardon and Ames' hanging could be found in newspapers, political 
broadsides, and such productions of vernacular legal culture as execution sermons, 
dying speeches, and the mock executions of effigies. Popular culture, not high 
constitutionalism, mediated between politics and official law. Eighteenth-century 
Bostonians demonstrated their ability to grasp complex legal doctrine: criminal 
intent, distinctions between murder and manslaughter, the role of juries in judging 
fact and law, the weighing of appropriate punishment for theft, and the place of 
incarceration or dissection as an instrument of punishment. More strikingly, the 
transformation of these cases show how adept colonial radicals were at the manipu-
lation of legal symbols. Historians often have claimed that rebellion is antinomian, 
a rejection of the rule of laws. But just the opposite occurred in revolutionary 
Boston. The common people domesticated legal discourse. Precisely because legal 
process, and especially criminal law, was invested with a new-found political 
meaning, Americans would be able to construct a different understanding of punish-
ment in the late 1770s and 1780s, radically rejecting sanguinary punishment as a 
norm. 
Nothing better illustrates the popular appropriation of punishment in these cases 
than two small advertisements appearing in colonial papers. Barely a few lines each, 
these notices appear insignificant. But they demonstrate how radically the topogra-
phy of justice had shifted. Levi Ames' confessions, one advertisement read, are 
« available in the shop across from the courthouse ». Separated only by a street, the 
printing press, with its vernacular executions narratives, and the courthouse marked 
alternative seats of legal authority. Similarly, a mock advertisement identified 
Richardson as a wanted man. It called on Philadelphians to «produce him tarred and 
feathered at the coffee house, there to expiate his sins against his country by a public 
recantation». This notice embodied what must be understood as a demand for 
Richardson's retrial. But there were significant differences. The purpose of the new 
trial would be retribution. Punishment would proceed his appearance and 
Richardson would not be allowed to escape unchastised. This time the public 
confession would be crafted by Richardson himself, not fabricated as a piece of 
popular culture. Most importantly, the coffee house replaced the courthouse as the 
place of justice 7 0 . 
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